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NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAws-DIvORCE-DO.ICILE-It is now well
settled that marriage is not a contract, but a status,' and that a
state, in the exercise of its undoubted right to regulate the domestic and social condition of those domiciled within its borders,'may .determine the commencement, continuation, and determination of such marriage relation.' A recent case in Delaware' illustrates the application of these established principles. The
parties were citizens of and resident in Russia at the time of their
marriage. They rcmoved to this country, settled in Delaware,
I Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, §x i: "Marriage, as distinguished from
the agreement to marry and from the act of being married, is the civil status of
one man and one woman legally united for life, with the rights and duties, which
for the establishment of families and the multiplication and education of the
species, are, and from time to time thereafter may be, assigned by the law to
matrimony." Wharton on Conflict of Laws, § 126, 111 Ed.; Ditson v. Ditson,
4 R. 1. 87 (1856).
Shader v. Graham, ioHow. 82 (185i).
* Maynard v. Ilill, 125 U. S.190 (1887); Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282
(1875); State v. Walker, 36 Kan. 297 (1887); Baity v. Cranfill, 91 N. C. 293
(1884); Francais v. State, 9 Tex. App. (88o).
4Cohen v. Cohen, 84 Ati. Rep. 122 (Del., 1912).
(184)

NOTES

and the plaintiff took out his first papers. Before becoming
fully naturalized and while still retaining his foreign allegiance,
the plaintiff was deserted by his wife in such fashion as to give
him ground for divorce under the local statute; he thereupon
brought suit, having obtained personal service on the defendant.
The court in entering a decree nisi said that the plaintiff had
acquired a domicile within the state, that marriage was a status
over which the state had control in respcct to its domiciled residents, and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce
although an alien whose marriage had been performed according
to the laws of a foreign sovereign.
As nationality and citizenship are entirely distinct from
domicile' the decision in the principal case would be equally applicable if the parties had been citizens of another state and not
aliens. Conceding that a state may determine the statusof its
domiciled residents, the most frequent and important resulting
question in this country of forty-eight separate jurisdictions is as
to the extra-territorial effect of such a decree on the status and
property of the parties.
When neither party is domiciled within the state, it is clear
that the court has no jurisdiction and that a decree so rendered
will have no binding force as to either party in another state.'
A few courts have held that when both parties, although not
residents, have appeared at the trial, a decree there rendered
should be binding in the state of residence in a controversy between the parties, 7 but not in a suit between the state and one
of the parties.' This distinction, which seems to disregard the
'tact that marriage is a status and not a contract, has been repudiated by the Supreme Court of the United States.$ A recent case
in England similarly holds that appearance will not cure lack of
jurisdiction. 10
When both parties are domiciled and there has been proper
service as required by the local statute, the court has jurisdiction
of both the subject matter and the persons. It is settled that a
decree rendered under such circumstances will be binding everywhere as to the status of both parties, not only by principles of
$Wharton, Conflict of Laws, § 8, III Ed.; Dicey on Conflict of Laws, 2nd
Ed., p. 15.
6 State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (878); Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263 (87
Hardy v. Smith, 136 Mass. 328 (1884); People v. Smith, 13 Hun. 414 (N.

.,

1878), The cases cited dealt with the validity of Utah divorces under a statute
authorizing the grant of divorces to those who merely desired to become residents of the state.
7 In re Ellis' Est., 55 Minn. 401 (893); Waldo v. Waldo, 52 Mich. 94 (1885).
' People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247 (1872); Van Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio 317
(1882).
'Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1902); Loan Society v. Dormitzer,
192 U. 5. 125 (1903).
20Armitage v. Atty.-Gen., (i9o6) Prob. x35.
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international law," but by virtue of the "full faith and credit"
clause of the Federal Constitution.".
When either the libellant or the libelee is domiciled within
the state, but not both of them, the fundamental difference in
this branch of the law between England and this country arises
in determining whose domicile shall be the criterion. English
courts conceive of a woman as having a separate domicile only
when she is in the domicile of matrimony and has been deserted;"
otherwise her domicile is that of her husband, and she must bring
suit wherever that may be." In this country it is generally held
that for purposes of divorce a wife may acquire a separate domicile
not only at the previous matrimonial domicile," 5 but also in a
different state or country. 6 In some jurisdictions it is held that
the separation must have taken place without fault in the wife
for her to acquire a separate domicile;"7 in others only the actual
facts of a separate residence are regarded.,$ This distinction is
chiefly of importance in those states which consider service by
publication sufficient as regards an absent resident, but insufficient
in the case of a non-resident, for then a court in refusing to recognize a divorce granted in another state on such service would have
to look behind the finding of the trial court, and hold that the
wife was not justified in fact in living apart from her husband.$
As intimated above, the international status of the party not
domiciled in the divorce jurisdiction will depend upon the view
each particular court may take as to the sufficiency of service,
and in this country upon the interpretation of the "full faith and
credit" clause of the Constitution, jurisdiction of the person As
well as the subject matter being essential to give a decree of a
court any extra-territorial force. When the suit is brought at
the libellee's domicile and the latter is resident within the state,
general principles of international law concede that whatever
service is provided by local statute, whether personal or con" Hood v. Hood, i i Allen x96 (Mass., 1867).
12 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8 (U. S., 1870).
13 Dicey on Conflict of Laws, 2nd Ed., p. 263; Armytage v. Armytage, (1898)

Prob. 178.
" Dicey on Conflict of Laws, 2nd Ed., p. 261; Le Suer v. Le Suer, i P. D.
139 (Eng., 1876).
5 Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437 (1870); Watkins v. Watkins, 135 Mass. 83
(1884); Bowman v. Bowman, 24 111. App. i65 (1888).
6 llarteau v. ltarteau. 14 Pick. 181 (Mass., 1836); Harding v. Allen, 9 Me.
140 (1835); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. 1. 87 (x856); Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 1o8
(U. S., 87o).
17 Sutor v. Sutor, 72 Miss. 345 (1895); Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 70
(1884); Burleu v. Shannon, 115 Mass. 438 (1875).
's John on v. Johnson, 57 Kan. 343 (1896); McGrew v. Ins. Co., 132 Col.
85 (191o); Irby v. Wilson, 21 N. C. 568 (1 Dev. & B. Eq., 1837).
19 Atherton v. Atherton, 155 N. Y. 12?9 (1898), also in Supreme Court x8t
U. S. 155, where it is held that a state may treat a wife who is unjustifiably absent from the matrimonial domicile as if she were in fact domiciled therein, and
render a decree on service by publication entitled to recognition in all states
under the "full faith and credit" clause.

NOTES

structive, will be sufficient extra-territorially;20 when he is domiciled, but non-resident, it is usually held that constructive or substituted service is enough to subject him to the jurisdiction of the
court. 21

When the libellee is a non-resident and absent from the

state, a number of jurisdictions hold that service by publication
is sufficient,2 but the weight of authority seems to be opposed to
this

view..2

A

curious

result of the latter opinion,

generally

known as the New York doctrine, is that one party may be legally divorced while the other is still considered as married. That
is, if A is domiciled in Nevada and B in New York, a divorce in
the former state will in New York be held valid as to A, but not
as to B on whom there was no personal service. The Supreme

Court of the United States has held that such a situation is not
cured by the "full faith and credit" clause, and that while another
state may, it is not obligatory that it should recognize such decree. 2' In the principal case 25 the libellant was domiciled within
the state and there was personal service on the libellee who was

non-resident; assuming that the service on the libellee was tech-

nically correct, that is, she was within the state when served,"I
or assuming that she appeared at the trial,27 the decree rendered

should, under the principles discussed above, be entitled to international recognition as to the status of both parties.
No matter what may be its effect extra-territorially, the
validity of a divorce decree within the state rendering it, provided
that the local statutes have been followed, never seems to be

questioned by courts testing such decree collaterally.

While

it may seem inconsistent for a state to refuse to recognize the
decree of another jurisdiction and at the same time itself issue

a similar decree under like circumstances, the reasoning of the
courts seems sound: that locally they are bound by their statutes, but that collaterally they may apply the settled principles

of international law.2S

It has been stated that the constitutional

20 Fleming v. West,
21 Hunt v. Hunt, 72

98 Ga. 778 (896); Beckerdyke v. Allen, 157111.95 (1921).
N. Y. 217 (1879); Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y. 4o8 (1891).
2 Butler v. Washington, 45 La. Ann. 279 (1857); Shafer v. Bushnell, 24

Wis. 372 (1870); Thomas v. King, 95 Tenn. 6o (1895); Thompson v. State, 28

Ala.

12 (I856).
Whether service by publication is sufficient or not depends principally upon
the view taken of the nature of the action; if analogous to an action in rem, such
service gives jurisdiction as held by the above cases; if in personan, it does not.
2 Love v. Love, io Phila. 453 (1873); McGeffert v. .McGeffert, 31 Barb. 69
(N. Y., 2859); People v. Baker, 76
Y. 78 (1879); Doughty v. Doughty, 28
"N.J. Eq. 581 (I Stew., 1877); Sheets N.
v. Sheets, 6 Lane. Law Rev. (Pa., 1889).
24 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
2 Cohen v. Cohen, supra.
2
6 In a jurisdiction which holds that a wife cannot acquire a separate domicile when at fault, the libellee in the principal case would still be domiciled in
Delaware inasmuch as she deserted her husband without cause. Therefore personal service would be unnecessary, and anything amounting to constructive or
substituted service would be sufficient.
27Kumier v. Kumier, 45 N. Y. 535 (1872); Kinigan v. Kinigan, I5 N. J. Eq.
146 (1867).
2 Wharton on Conflict of Laws, 3rd Ed. p. 500.
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provision of "due process of law" has not been applied to divorce
actions, and that if it were, as for instance in Pennoyer v. Neff,2"
there would be no reason for the unfortunate standard by which
there is one test as to validity within the state and another as to
validity without the state. 30 It is submitted that it would be
more accurate to say that, as the action of divorce differs from
other actions, conclusions as to what constitutes "due process"
in such other actions are not applicable, and that as a matter of
fact courts have considered that there is "due process" as intended by. the Constitution in a divorce action whether service
on the libellee be personal or substituted. 31 Property may be
affected by a decree of divorce, but it is affected by the changed
status of the parties, and is not proceeded against in the action.
For instance, the dower rights of A in certain land depend upon
whether or not she is the wife of B. Consequently it is incorrect
to draw analogies from actions in which property rights are in question; it should not be concluded that divorces granted on service
by publication are without due process of law because the Supreme
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff held that a personal judgment against
a non-resilent on such service was invalid, and that no title to
property passed by a sale under an execution issued upon such a
judgment.
S.A.
DAMAGES-Loss OF FUTURE. PROFrfs-Damages for the loss
of future profits, as a general rule, cannot be recovered in an action for the breach of a contract,1 not so much due to the fact that
they are profits as to the fact that there are said to be no adequate
criteria which will make certain a reasonably accurate measurement.2 Consequently, since the fult lies not in the profits themselves, but in ascertaining them, the courts are uniformly willing
to allow loss of profits to be included in the damages whenever
there are facts sufficient to make the verdict more than mere guesswork. For instance, if either party refuses to complete a contract of sale the measure of damages is3 the difference between the
contract price and the market value.
In the frequently cited case of Hadley v. Baxendale,4 it is
stated that profits can be recovered where they arise from the
contract itself and may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, or
where they arise from extraordinary circumstances depending
295 U. S. 714 (1877).
10Wharton on Conflicts of Laws, 3rd
21See reasoning of court in Ditson v.

Maynard v. Hill,

125

Ed. p. 502.
Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 (1856).

U. S. 19o (1887), which held valid a legislative divorce,

there being no notice to a non-resident libellee.
I Howard v. Stillwater etc. Co., z39 U. S. i99 (189o).
2 Brigham v. Carlisle, 78 Ali. 243 (1887).

Lincoln v. Alshuler, 142 Wis. 475 (i9i).
' 9 Exechequer 341 (1854).

NOTES

upon the fulfillment of the contract and of which the party to be
charged had notice at the time of its execution., Of the latter
class are the well-known cases involving contracts of carriage of
goods of immediate necessity and peculiar value to the owner,
as, for instance, a theatrical outfit. There the loss of profits due
to failure to deliver in time or in good condition is included in the
damages, providing the carrier has notice of the nature of the
goods.g
Of that class of profits coming under the heading of profits
that arise naturally from the contract and are in contemplation
of the parties, quite prominent are those arising from contracts
of agency which provide for the compensation of the agent by a
fixed proportion of the profits from sales made by him. As a
rule such profits, or rather the compensation measured by a percentage of the probable profits, can be recovered, on the theory
that the action is for the value of the contract broken and that it
can be determined only by ascertaining the probable sales during
the remainder of the term of the contract, and from them the
profits. 7 On the other hand, in several jurisdictions the recovery
has been confined to "earned" profits, i. e. those arising from
sales actually negotiated by the agent, but repudiated by the principal when he broke the contract.' The authority of two of the
decisions in support of the latter view is in doubt. Washburn v.
htubbardg was called to the attention of the court in Wakeman v.
Wheeler, etc., Co., t ° but it was ignored, and recovery was allowed
for both actual and probable profits. Howe etc. Co. v. Bryson"l
was questioned in a subsequent case in the same jurisdiction and
its conclusion in this respect practically pronounced dictum."2
The insurance agency cases are frequently cited as being in
accord with the opinion that recovery should be limited to actual
earned profits, since the damages are limited to a percentage of
the premiums arising from renewals, but not from possible new
policies. The accuracy of the life and actuary tables make the
former sufficiently certain.13
A recent Massachusetts case extends the right to the recovery
5For cases applying and approving this rule see Masterson v. Brooklyn, 6
Hill 6x (N. Y., 1845); Gagnon v. Sperry, 2o6 Mass. 547 (1910).
6Weston v. B. & M. R. R., 19o Mass. 298 (19o6).
7 Dennis v. Maxfield, io Allen 438 (Mass., 1865); Wakeman v. Wheeler,

ioi N. Y. 205 (1886); Pittsburgh Guage Co. v. Ashton Valve Co., 184 Pa. 36
(1898); Schumacker v. Heineman, 99 Wis. 251 (1898); Cranmer v. Kohn, 7 S. D.
247 (1895); Hickhorn, etc. Co. v. Bradley, 117 Iowa 130 (1902).
8Union Refining Co. v. Barton, 77 Ala. 148 (1884); Bates v. Diamond Salt
Co., 36 Neb. 900 (1893); Howe, etc. Co. v. Bryson, 44 Iowa 159 (1876); Washburn v. Hubbard, 6 Lansing ii (N. Y., 1872).
06 Lansing I (N. Y., 1872).
10 1o N. Y. 205 (1886).
144 Iowa 159 (1876).
12

Hickhorn, etc. Co. v. Bradley, 117 Iowa 130

(1902).

v. Mutual Life Ins. Association, 99 Fed.
Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 534 (1876).
13Wells

222

(29oo); Lewis v. Atlas
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of profits to an extreme degree." The contract was one of agency
for the sale of automobiles in a certain district. The contract
was broken by the principal before any sales had been made by
the agent. Nevertheless the latter was allowed to recover for
loss of possible profits. Standards pointed out to-aid the jury in
arriving at the damages were the sales made by the defendant
in the same district subsequent to the breach of this contract,
and sales of other cars made by the plaintiff. Attention was
called to the growth of the industry and the increased demand for
motor driven vehicles. There is lacking, however, one important
element: past profits earned under prior contracts or under the
contract in question before it was broken. It is true that past
profits are said to be too unreliable to warrant an attempt to assess damages for loss of future profits. 1" Nevertheless, they are
invariably cited by the appellate courts as being of considerable
importance in determining the proper damages. For this reason,
i. e. that the element of past profits is lacking in the case given
above, it would seem from remarks made in one case that loss of
profits under these circumstances would not be included in the
damages, even in those jurisdictions where it could ordinarily be
recovered. 16 Another case involving the same situation is flatly
contrary, but
its jurisdiction takes a contrary view on the general
7
question.1
It is interesting to note that in another Massachusetts case
on facts quite similar, except that it was the agent who broke the
contract, the principal was denied recovery of damages for the
loss of future profits on the ground that they were too remote and
too contingent."

J.S.B.
FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS-PERSONAL

LIABILITY

OF AGENT

the Pennsylvania Act of Assembly of 1874,' a foreign corporation is required
to establish an office in the state, with an appointed agent, and
also to register with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, before
it may transact any business. The Act provides a punishment
in the way of fine and imprisonment for anyone who undertakes
to act as agent for such a corporation before it has registered.
There is no mention of civil liability of the agent in the statute,
but the Pennsylvania courts have decided that he is personally
ACTING FOR UNREGISTERED CORPORATION-Under

"4Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 99 N. E. Rep.

221

(Mass., 1912).

"5Sutherland on Damages (3d edition), VoL I,-Section 69.

'17 S. D. 247 (1895).

1778 Ala. 243 .(887).
Hs
letherington & Sons v. Fir-th & Co., 210 Mass. 821 (1911).

'Act of April

22,

1874, P. L.

1o8

(Pa.).

NOTES

liable to the same extent that the corporation itself would have
been, had it been properly. registered.'
It is clear that a state may make a statute such as this. In
the words of Mr. Justice McCollum in the leading case of Lasher
v. Slimson:3 "The right of the state to dictate the terms on which
a foreign corporation shall be permitted to -transact business
within its jurisdiction cannot be doubted, if the conditions imposed
are not repugnant to the.Constitution of the United States, or inconsistent with those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each state from encroachment by all
others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without opportunity for defence."4
But when the state has once imposed the c6nditions under
which it will allow the foreign corporation to come within its
jurisdiction, should the courts, by judicial legislation, be allowed
to add whatever further penalties they see fit? The Pennsylvania courts evidently think they have that power, for in addition to the criminal liability imposed by the Act itself, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has added the personal, civil liability of
the agent. The line of reasoning by which this new liability is
found, is logical enough. The steps are,-first, the corporation,
not having the legal sanction of the state to operate within it,
has no existence at all within that state; second, the corporation
being non-existent, the agent who undertakes to act for such a
principal, must himself be liable.' Admitting that the result is
strictly legal, its expediency is at least questionable. The injured party had never intended to look to the agent for redress in
case of loss. It was the principal corporation that he had in
mind in concluding the contract, and he should have taken steps,
in protecting himself, toward ascertaining that the principal existed in legal contemplation. That many states have taken this
view of the matter is shown by the fact that they have incorporated express provisions in their statutes imposing liability on
the agent in such a case.' There is even some direct 7authority
contra to the Pennsylvania decision on a similar statute.
'Raff v. Isman, 84 At!. Rep. 352 (Pa., 1912), reaffirming Lasher v. Stimson,
145Pa. 3o (i89i). In the Raff v. k.man case, the defendant signed a buildingcon-

tract "as agent for Hepner Hair Emporium Co.," an unregistered corporation.
He was held personally liable for the unpaid balance of the contract price.

3 145 Pa. 3o (821), at p. 34.
4See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, iS Howard 404 (U. S. S. C., 1855).
6 Kroeger v. Pitcairn, iox Pa. 311 (1882); McConn v. Lady. io W. N. C.
493 (Pa., 188z). The English law is clear that where a corporation, not having
the power to do a certain act, authorizes an agent to perform that act and he
does it, the agent is personally liable. Commercial Bank v. Kitson, L. R. 12 Q. B.
D. 157 (1883). Agent is also personally liable on an implied contract where he
wilfully represents that he has certain authority which, in fact, he has not.
Randell v. Trimen, x8 C. B. 786 (i8S6).
'Texas Rev. St., Arts. 3093, 3o95; Virginia Code, Sect. 11oS; Minnesota
Code, Sect. 87.
7Jones v. Horn, 78 S. IV. Rep. 638 (Mo., 19o4) and cases there cited.
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A more equitable solution of the problem than that reached
in the Pennsylvania courts would be to make the contract voidable at the election of the other contracting party, but not wholly
void. Some western jurisdictions have adopted this expedient.S
The Wisconsin statute covering this point is practical and rational.
It provides that "every contract made by or on behalf of any
affecting the personal liability
such (foreign) corporation . .
thereof or relating to property within this state, before it shall
have complied with the provisions of this section (requiring
registration, etc.), shall be wholly void on its behalf. . ., but
Thus, although the foreign cor"9
shall be enforceable against it.
poration is not recognized as a legal entity within the state, yet
its contracts can be enforced against it in the courts of that state.
The plaintiff also has the further remedy, if he wants to make
use of it, of going into the courts of the corporation's home state
and there suing it, contract actions being transitory. A corporation, like a natural person, is suable in personam in any state into
which it migrates and settles,, and in which service of process
can be lawfully had upon it under the governing statutes.1 0
In view of the fact that nearly all the state statutes prohibit
foreign corporations from "doing or carrying on business within
the state," unless they have complied with the conditions imposed
by the statute, it .is interesting to note what constitutes "doing
business" in violation of such prohibitions. It is almost universally conceded that isolated transactions between a foreign
corporation and the citizens of a state are not a doing of business
within the state by the foreign corporation." A few illustrations
of such isolated transactions are, receiving subscriptions for a
newspaper published in another state; 2 purchasing a piece of
real estate; 3 taking security for debts due the corporation;I
making' a single sale or contract for the sale of goods.' 5 These
statutory prohibitions cannot, of course, interfere with or restrict
the freedom of interstate commerce nor conflict with the settled
of the commerce clause of the Federal Constituinterpretation
16
tion.
J.F.N.
8 Ames

v. Kruzner, i Alaska 58 (i92); Insurance Co. v. Winne, 20 Mont.

,
20 (1897).
IWisconsin

35'.

Statutes 1898, sect. 177o b, as amended by Laws of i899, ch.
and cases there cited under note 69.

0 See 19 Cyc. 1326

" Delaware River Quarry Co. v. Passenger Ry. Co., 204 Pa. 22 (1902);
Canal Co. v. Mahlenbrock, 63 N. J. L. 281 (x899); Schillinger v. Brewing Co.
107 11. App. 335 (1903).
12Beard v. Publishing Co., 71 Ala. 6o (x88i).
3 l.ouisville Property Co. v. Nashville, 84 S. V. Rep.. 81o (Tenn., 1905).
14 Insurance Co. v. Sawyer, 44 Wis. 387 (1878).
16 Canal Co. v. Mahlenbrock, 63 N. J. L. 281 (1899); Wile v. Onsel, 2o Pa.
Co. Rep. 659 (1891).
is Cooper Manuf. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727 (1889).

NOTES
IMASTER AND SERVANT-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A

LAW PRO-

HIBITING EMPI.OYER FROM CONTRACTING WITH EMPLOYEE THAT

THE LATTER SHALL WITHDRAW FRO.M A LABOR UNION-In State

v. Coppage,' such a statute 2 was declared valid, and as the case is
contrary to all previous cases upon the point, a study of those

cases and of the conditions leading to the passage of such a statute

may bring forth reasons for sustaining it.
After the Civil War the power of the masters of the large industries which slowly began to develop, to dictate any terms of
employment, and the helplessness of the individual laborer because of economic pressure, impelled the laboring classes of the
country to adopt means to enable. them to meet the employers
upon an equal footing. Labor organizations of all kinds, strikes,
and boycotts were the result, and to repel this advance the masters
adopted the blacklist of employees, and employers associations,
and discharged or refused to employ laborers who were connected
with labor organizations. Legislation to restrict the powers of
the master class and thus indirectly aid the weaker class and also
to avert the frequent clashes between them with the usual destruction of life and property seemed indispensible.
Statutes providing that it was unlawful for an employer to
discharge an employee because he was a member of a labor organization were passed and were in every case held unconstitutional.' The ground of those decisions is that by the constitutional
guaranty of life, liberty and property, an employer has the
right to discharge an employee with or without cause, subject
only to a civil action for damages in a proper case, and the employee has the corresponding right to labor or to refuse to labor for
another. Judge Cooley said: "It is a part of every man's civil
rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with
any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason,
or is the result 'of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice.'
Statutes which require an employer to give the reason or cause
of dismissal have been held invalid on the ground that "the liberty to remain silent is correlative with the freedom to speak."'
' 125 Pac. Rep. 8 (Kan., 1912).
2 Gen. Stat. of 19o9 sections 4674 and 4675; the former section reading,
"That it shall be unlawful for any (employer) to coerce, rcquire, demand or
influence any person or persons to enter into any agreement, either written or
oral, not to join or become or remain a member of any labor organization or association, as a condition of such person or persons securing employment, or continuing in the employment of such (employer)."
3 State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530 (1902); Brick Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297
(1904); Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. 161 (19o8).
I Cooley on Torts, ist. ed. p. 278; 2nd. ed. p. 328. The passage quoted is
cited with approval in each of the cases in note 3 (supra).
6 Quoted from Atchison, etc. Ry. v. Brown, 80 Kan. 312 (1909). Wallace v.
Georgia Ry. Co., 94 Ga. 732 (894); N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Schaffer, 65 Ohio St. 414
(i9oi), accord. A statute making it a misdemeanor for any person who has
contracted in writing to serve another for any given time, to quit in breach of
said contract and to make a second contract of similar nature with another person, without giving the second employer notice of the existence of the first contract, was held unconstitutional in Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120 (1904).
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Statutes prioviding that it shall be unlawful for an employer
to coerce or require any person to enter into an agreement not to
become or remain a member of any labor union, as a condition of
that person securing employment or continuing in the employment of such employer, have been held unconstitutional in every
decided case except the principal case. State v. Jzlo-w is a leading case; it held that the statute of Missouri was unconstitutional
because it made that a crime which was the exercise of a constitutional right, to wit, the termination of a contract, and also
because the statute did not tend to promote the public health,
welfare, comfort or safety-a characteristic essential to an exercise of the police power. These two reasons are given in all the
decisions in accord with that case.
It may be conceded that a state legislature may designate
as a crime any act the commission of which tends to injure the
safety, health or moral and general welfare of the public; if the
coercion of an employee by his employer, in the opinion of the
legislature, is against public policy because of such injurious
tendency upon the public, it would logically follow that a statute,
which made such coercion a crime, would be perfectly valid. The
principal case alone goes to that extent.. The courts have taken
different views as to the effect to be given to the words "coerce
-or compel" in the statutes, and. as- to whether an employer'does
coerce an employee by a thre.t of discharge. One court' held
that "the words 'coerce or compel' were not intended to refer to
physical violence or interference with the person of the employee
. . . The mandate of the -statute is the substantial equivalent of
an enactment that a person slall not make the employment, or
the continuance of an employment, of a person conditional upon
the employee not joining or becoming a member of a labor organization." Another court' held that "the words 'coerce' and
'attempt to coerce' are to be considered as the mere statutory
names of the offense." A recent case 0 holds that a criminal complaint which merely alleged that the employer required the employee to make an agreement not to remain a member of a labor
organization did not state a criminal offense. The dictum of
that case is the only authority which supports the principal case,
for the court intimated that if coercion had been alleged a crime
would have been charged. The following language is very pertinent: "Theoretically, the employer and employee are on an
equality, so thit one is free to employ, the other to accept the
6 129 Mo. 163 (1895).
7 People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257 (i9o6); State v. Bateman, 7 Ohio Nisi
Prius 486 (i9oo), overruling Davis v. State, 3o Ohio W. L. B. 342 (1893); Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, iS9 Fed. 50 (i9o8); Statev.
Daniels, 136 N. W. Rep. 584 (Minn., 19t2). The latter two cases deal with
statutes which do not contain the words "coerce" or "compel."
8 People v. Marcus, suPra.
OState v. Bateman, supra.
OState v. Daniels, supra.
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emplovment, as he sees fit; but in practice it is to the employee
very often a matter of compulsion, and not of free choice . . .
his necessities may easily he made use of as a means of coercion."
Most courts refuse to recognize that economic pressure can be
the means of coercion, relying upon the theoretical equality of
employer and employee. The principal case reflects the important changes that are occurring in the industrial world. Laws of'
the state seeking to remedy evils and establish harmony between
the classes should be upheld even where the liberty of the individual is subjected to certain restraints, provided such restraints
are not arbitrary."t

I.B.

TORTS-DOCTRINE OF TIE LAST CLEAR CHANCE-An interesting variation of the application of the so-called doctrine of
the "last clear chance" is found in a recent decision of the Connecticut court of last resort. In Nehring v. Connecticut Co.i
the plaintiff negligently placed himself in a dangerous position
and carelessly continued to remain therein until lie was injured
by the defendant company, who, however, owing to .gross negligence, failed to observe the plaintiff's situation until too late to
avoid the injury. The Supreme Court, in a well-considered decision, held that the proximate cause of injury was the plaintiff's
want of due care and not the lack of due care on the part of the
defendant and accordingly, in offering a non-suit, declared that
the doctrine of the "last clear chance" did not apply.
Few rules of law appear to be more difficult to apply correctly
than this principle referred to. Fundamentally, it is the result
of the revolt of the early nineteenth century courts against the
hardship involved by the contributory negligence rule as it then
existed and is predicated on the theory that an act of negligence
or trespass committed by the plaintiff should not deprive him
ipso facto of all rights to safety and security by removing all legal
redress for whatever should subsequently befall him at the hands
of the defendant. The theory just stated is clearly shown in
the early leading cases of Lynch v. Nurdin2 and Bird v. Holbrook3
and the doctrine of the "last clear chance" finally crystallized
out in concrete form in the famous "donkey case" of Davies v.
itIn McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 547 (i9°9), the court, in a decision sustaining an act requiring coal to be measured for payment of miners'
wages before screening, said, "It is then the established doctrine of this court
that the liberty of contract is not universal, and is subject to restrictions passed
by the legislative branch of the Government in the exercise of its power to protect the safety, health and welfare of the people. It is also true that the police
power of the State is not unlimited, and is subject to judicial review, and when
exerted in an arbitrary or oppressive manner such laws may be annulled as violative of rights protected by the Constitution."
1 84 Atl. Rep. 301 (Conn., 1912).
2 A. & E. (N. S.) 35 (x841).
24 Bing. 268 (1828).
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Mann' where Lord Abinger, C. B.. said, "As the defendant might,
by proper care, have avoided injuring the animal . . . he is

liable for the consequences of his negligence, though the animal
may have been improperly there. "- Thus it clearly follows that
this negligence or omission of the party last in fault, must be regarded as constituting, the sole proximate cause of the injury,
and the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff must be disregarded
as-being too remote.6 Thus, the real function of the doctrine of
the "last clear chaice" is merely to strip from the negligence of
the plaintiff the attribute expressed by the word "contributory"
by finding that the defendant's acts were the sole proximate cause
of the accident; 7 and unless it is so found, the doctrine can never
apply.
While easily formulated, the rule is in reality of such an abstract metaphysical character as to furnish considerable difficulty
in practical application; and upon some of its subdivisions the
cases are in great confusion. It is true that practically all jurisdictions s allow recovery for an injury caused by the defendant's
negligence, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's own negligence exposed him to the risk of injury, if such injury was more
immediately caused by the defendant's omission, after9 becoming
aware of the plaintiff's danger, to use ordinary carel0 for the purpose of avoiding injury to him. When, however, this principle
has been extended in any way, the decisions become at variance.
In considering the various situations which arise under the
rule, the first question which naturally arises is as to whether or
not the negligence of the defendant is sufficient to bring the case
within the rule if it consists of some act or omission occurring
4io M. & W. 545 (1855); sCe also Radley v. R. R. Co., L. R. x App. Cas.
754 (1876).
&Or, as stated by Lord Penzance in Radley v. R. R. Co., supra: "If the
defendant could in the result by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence have
avoided the mischief, then the plaintiff's negligence vill not excuse him."
6 "The party who has the last opportunity of avoiding the accident is not
excused by the negligence of anyone else. His negligence and not that of the
one first in fault is the sole proximate cause of the injury."
z Shearm & Redf.
Neg. (5th d.) sec. 99.
7 "The one that had the last clear opportunity to avoid the accident. . . is
solely responsible for it . . . his negligence being deemed the direct and proximate cause of it." i Thomp. Neg. 230.
3'See summary of cases given in Shearm & Redf. Neg., see. 99, where the
rulings of all the American jurisdictions are collected.
9 It is a.fundamental principle of the doctrine that the defendant's negligent
act must be after or his omission must continue subsequent to the plaintiff's
negligence. Thus no recovery can be allowed for the killing of a trespasser.
due to lack of adequate brakes on a train, since this negligent condition was
prior to the plaintiff's act. Sfiiith v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 114 N. C. 728 (1894);
and tide Sullivan v.Miss. Pac. R. Co., i7 Mo. 214 (t893).
10 It seems settled that a charge that the defendant is liable unless its servants did everything in their power to prevent the accident is too narrow and
is good cause for a new trial. Mobile R. Co. v. \Vatly, 69 Miss. 145 (1891);
Norfolk etc. R. C. v. Dunnaway, 93 Va. 29 (1898).
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before the discovery of the plaintiff's peril. If the negligent act
of the defendant occurred before the plaintiff's negligence the
cases seem to hold that the doctrine of the "last clear chance"
cannot be raised; but there is a great conflict of cases as to the
true rule when the defendant has been guilty of some omission
of duty which prevented the plaintiff's part from being noticed
in time to avoid the injury. Many of the cases take the view that
here the doctrine of the last clear chance is founded upon actual
knowledge of the plaintiff's danger, irrespective of whether or
not it was the defendant's duty to have provided means of
knowledge 2 and a few jurisdictions hold that under this doctrine
the defendant is liable only if chargeable with wanton fault
or recklessness." It is submitted that both these views are not
only incorrect from the point of view of law and logic, but are also
extremely discreditable to civilized jurisprudence. The violation
of a duty owed to the plaintiff to exercise care to discover his exposed situation should certainly not be permitted to defeat his
subsequent recovery-a man should not profit by his own wrongful act. The better view and the weight of authority accordingly
holds the defendant liable if the injury results from the omission
of an act which constituted a breach of duty owed" to the plaintiff, whether this breach occurred before or after the discovery of
the plaintiff's danger, if it intervened or continued after the negligence of the plaintiff had ceased.' 5 In the principal case ante,
it is true that the breach of duty owed to the plaintiff continued
practically up to the time of the injury, but the plaintiff's own
negligence also continued until the accident occurred and consequently the Connecticut court rightly decided that the defendant's negligence was not the sole proximate cause and accordingly
affirmed the non-suit of the lower court.
P. C. M. Jr.
TRUSTS-BANK DEPOSIT iY TRUSTEE-Smith v. Fuller,' in the
Ohio Supreme Court, is a recent case denying the right of a trustee
winding up the affairs of a defunct savings fund to deposit the
"

Vide note 9, supra.

' N. Y., N. 1I. & H. Ry. Co. v. Kelley, 93 Fed. 745 (1899); Sweeney v. N. Y.
Steam Co. 117 N. Y. 642 (1890); Milwaukee etc. Co. v. Torch, to8 Wis. 593
(19oi); Barnett v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 132 N. W. Rep. 973 (Ia., 19it);
and the decisions in Arkansas, Colorado and Montana.
"1Frazer v. Ala. R. Co., 8o Ala. 105 (1886); Mulhein v. D. L. & W. R. Co.,
8x Pa. 366 (1877); and cases in Indiana, Louisana and Oregon.

" Some of the courts have gone astray on this point, and have failed to distinguish between a breach of a duty owed and conduct amounting to wanton
fault or recklessness.
15 Smith v. N. & S. R. Co., 114 N. C. 728 (1894); Richmond v. Sacramento
Valley R. Co., 18 Cal.,351 (iS~r); Battesbull v. luniphreys, 64 Mlich. 514 (1889);
Edgerly v. Street R. Co., 67 N. H. 312 (1894); Virginia Md. R. Co. v. White,

84 Va. 498 (1889); and the decisions in Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nevada, Utah and W. Virginia.

'99 N. E. Rep. 214 (Ohio, 1912).
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trust fund, as a general deposit, in another bank. The trustee
left the money with the bank, upon a certificate of deposit, in his
name as trustee. The account was not subject to check. No
agreement was made to pay interest. There was no stipulation
for the return of the identical money. The bank failed, and the
trustee was allowed to maintain an action for the whole sum, as
a preferred creditor," on the theory that the deposit was special.
The court remarked that the trustee was without power to make
a general deposit, because that established the relation of debtor
and creditor, and therefore amounted to a loan. Since the bank
knew of the trust, from the form of the certificate, the parties must
have intended to act within the limits of the trust and make a
special deposit.
The holding of the court, that a trustee may not make a
general deposit in a solvent bank, is clearly against the weight of
authority. 2 True, a trustee must at all times keep the trust res
under his control,3 and may not make a loan of the funds on merely
personal security, but, where the subject of the trust is money,
a right to deposit that money temporarily in a responsible bank
is recognized almost everywhere. 4 Such -a deposit is not regarded
as a loan in violation of- the trust, though the relation of debtor
and creditor exists between the bank and the trustee. The distinction drawn in Law's Estate5 expresses very well the underlying thought of the cases. A deposit is a temporary disposition
of the money for safe keeping. When not made for safe keeping,
but for a fixed period, it is a loan. It is upon this ground of safety
that a trustee is justified in making a general deposit of the trust
money in a solvent bank, and upon this ground a deposit is distinguished from a loan or investment.
A trustee who keeps -a large sum of trust money about his
person can hardly be said to be managing his trust according to
the general usage of prudent persons. He may be charged with
the interest that would have been earned had the money been
deposited,6 and accordingly, it would seei that he would be
chargeable with any consideration paid for a special deposit. If
no consideration is paid, the depositary, as a gratuitous bailee, is
liable only for gross negligence-quaere, whether this would therefore be a prudent and proper disposition of the trust fund.
It is, of course, a question of sound common sense, to de-

2 Trustee v. Cockrell, xo6 Ky. 578 (1899); Law's Est., 144 Pa. 499 (i89 );
Officer v. Officer, 120 Ia. 389 (i9o3); McAfee v. Bland, ii S. W. Rep. 439 (Ky.,

1899).
3Law's Est., supra; Frankenfield's App.,

Trusts, 12th ed.. p. 330; Salway v. Sialway,

102

Pa. 589 (1883); Lewin on

Russ. & M.
4 Lewin on Trusts, 12th ed., p. 330 and citations.
I Supra.
2

215

(1831).

SI)alrymple v. Gamble, 68 .Md. 156 (1887).
Foster v. Esz.x B'k., 17 Mass. 479 (1821); B'k.v. Graham, 85 Pa. 91 (1877);
Whitney v. B'k., 55 Vt. i54 (1882).
7
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termine just when a so-called deposit is really a loan-just how
long a temporary disposition for safety might be.'
Upon the question whether or not this was in fact a special
deposit, it may be said that ordinarily, when money, whether a
trust fund or not, is deposited in a bank, it is deemed a general
deposit, unless there is an express agreement that it shall be a
special deposit or there are circumstances clearly implying such
an agreement, for instance, that the money is in packages not
to be opened.' This is entirely consistent with the nature of a
banking business. Is this presumption overbalanced by the fact
that no agreement had been reached relative to paying interest?
There are any number of cases holding that the addition of
the word . "clerk," or "judge of probate, license money," or
"trustee" to the title of an account (foes not create a special deposit, in the absence of an obligation to return the specific money,0
nor does the taking of an interest-bearing certificate of deposit,'
or making a deposit as the money of a third person.12 The trust
relation is not carried over when there is no misappropriation.1 $
The chose in action becomes the res of the trust, and attempts to
secure priority upon the ground that the money itself is impressed
with a trust, have failed." Cases holding that the depositary
cannot refuse to pay to the cestui qui trust are often cited as controlling in such attempts. While the language used may sometimes seem to imply that a trust is imposed on the money, nevertheless, those cases only decide that the debt created by the trustee, belongs to the ceslui gui trust, 5 and cannot be pressed to the
extent of holding that the cestui qui trust should be a preferred
creditor.
Deposits in violation of a statute stand upon an entirely
different footing, and the depositary is held to be a trustee." To
hold otherwise in such a case would be to ratify a wilful violation
of the law.
J.C.D.
s Law's Et., supra.
' Morse on Banks and Banking, § 186; Brahm v. Adkins, 77 I11.263 (1875);
Dawson v. Bank, 5 Ark, 297 (184!).
10McLain v. Wallace, 1o3 Ind. 562 (1885); Otis v. Gross, 96 III. 612 (188o);
Alston v. Alabama, 92 Alabama 124 (189i); Officer-v. Officer, supra; Paul v.
Draper, i58 Mo. 197 (igoo); Law's Est., supra.
" Ruffin v. Commissioners, 69 N. C. 498 (1873).
12 Henry v. Martin, 88 Wis. 367 (1894).
Is Rhineland v. New Madrid Co., 99 Mo. App. 381 (i 03); Fletcher v. Sharpe,
io8 Ind. 276 (1886); O'Connor v. Mech. Bank, 124 N.
App. 324 (189).
14Officer v. Officer, supra.
15 O'Connor v. Mech. Bank, supra;Jaffray v. Towar, 63 N. J. Eq. 530 (1902);
National Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54 (1881).
16McAfie v. Bland, supra; District v. King, 8o Ia. 497 (1890); 52 Nebr. I
(1897). Contra: Lowry v. Polk Co., 51 Ia. 50 (1879).
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